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FEATURE COMMENT—The European
Defense Procurement Directive: An
American Perspective
Introduction—On August 21, the new European
directive on defense and security procurement,
Directive 2009/81/EC, entered into force. See, e.g.,
EU Adopts New Defense and Security Procurement
Directive, 6 IGC ¶ 65. Previously, most European
defense procurement was considered exempt from
the European procurement directives that have
harmonized procurement, with greater transparency and competition, across Europe. Under the
new defense directive, all but the most sensitive
defense and security procurements in Europe will
have to be conducted under rules consistent with
the new directive.
From an American vantage point, however,
it is not yet clear how the new directive will be
implemented. If the defense directive merely brings
new competition and transparency to the European procurement markets, the directive will be a
welcome improvement in what was traditionally a
closed and uncompetitive market. But if, in practice,
the directive is used as an excuse to discriminate
against U.S. exporters—or if it is perceived as a
tool of discrimination—the directive threatens to
trigger serious trade frictions in the transatlantic
defense markets.
The European Defense Market—When
compared to the U.S. defense market, the European
defense market is smaller and highly fragmented
across the European member states—in part, as the
European Commission itself has noted, because of
the highly fragmented laws across the many na4-068-521-1

tions. See European Commission, Interpretative
Communication on the Application of Article 296
of the Treaty in the Field of Defense Procurement,
COM(2006)779, Introduction (“Defence procurement law is an important element of this fragmentation. The majority of defence contracts are
exempted from Internal Market rules and awarded
on the basis of national procurement rules, which
have widely differing selection criteria, advertising
procedures, etc. ... All of this can limit market access
for non-national suppliers and therefore hampers
intra-European competition.”); Europe’s Movement
Toward a More Competitive Market for Defense
Procurement, 1 IGC ¶ 46.

The fragmentation of the European defense
market, and the stronger political emphasis put
on defense spending in the U.S., mean that U.S.
defense expenditures tend to loom large when compared to the individual European nations’ defense
spending. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute estimates that U.S. defense spending in 2008 totaled over $600 billion, substantially
overshadowing any other single nation’s defense
spending. See chart above, “$Billions in 2008 Defense Expenditures,” with data from SIPRI 2009
Yearbook, at 11, www.sipri.org/yearbook/2009/
files/SIPRIYB09summary.pdf.
The European Commission estimated in
2004 that overall defense expenditures in the EU
member states totaled approximately €160 billion
(roughly $235 billion at current exchange rates).
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See European Commission, COM(2004)608, Green
Paper on Defence Procurement, at 3 (2005), available
at ec.europa.eu/internal_market/publicprocurement/
dpp_en.htm; Aris Georgopoulos, The Commission’s
Green Paper on Defence Procurement, 2005 Pub.
Proc. L. Rev. NA34. The overall European defense
procurement market has been estimated at more
than €80 billion (over approximately $117 billion) annually; of that, the European Commission estimated
in 2006, roughly €30 billion ($45 billion) went to new
equipment. European Commission Press Release
IP/06/1703 (Dec. 7, 2006).
The barriers between the European member
states’ defense markets historically have been high,
due to national preferences and cumbersome licensing requirements for transferring sensitive technologies across borders. See, e.g., David R. Scruggs, Guy
Ben-Ari, Michele Flournoy and Julianne Smith, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS),
European Defense Integration: Bridging the Gap
Between Strategy and Capabilities, at 74-75 (October
2005), available at csis.org/publication/europeandefense-integration-bridging-gap-between-strategyand-capabilities; Joachim Hofbauer, Implications of
European Defense Acquisition Reform, Center for
Strategic and International Studies, Current Issues
No. 15 (Oct. 19, 2009); Martin Trybus, European Defence Procurement Law (1999).

The EU has been working for some time to improve Europe’s military capabilities, see David R.
Scruggs et al., supra, at 54–60, and the trend in European defense procurement has been towards greater
openness and competition, see Jeffrey P. Bialos,
Christine E. Fisher and Stuart L. Koehl, Fortresses
and Icebergs: The Evolution of the Transatlantic Defense Market and the Implications for U.S. National
Security Policy, at 12–13 (Johns Hopkins University,
School of Advanced International Studies, Center
for Transatlantic Relations) (executive summary
available at csis.org/event/book-launch-fortressesand-icebergs-jeffrey-p-bialos). European policymakers
hope the new procurement directive, and an earlier
directive to facilitate intra-European transfers of
sensitive technologies, see European Commission,
EU Transfers of Defence-Related Products, ec.europa.
eu/enterprise/regulation/inst_sp/defense_en.htm
(discussing Directive 2009/43/EC), will help bring
together the member states’ defense markets, to support development of the European defense-related
supplier base. See, e.g., EDA Continues Push for Integrated EU Defense Industry, 4 IGC ¶ 37.
The U.S. has a direct interest in stronger European defense capabilities, as the U.S. will likely work
closely with its European allies to combat future
shared threats. See, e.g., Klaus Naumann and Gen.
Joseph Ralston (ret.), Foreword, in David R. Scruggs
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et al., supra, at 4. An important recent report, Jeffrey P. Bialos et al., Fortresses and Icebergs, supra,
discussed the current integration between the U.S.
and European defense industries. The authors of
this very comprehensive report drew on a metaphor
commonly used to describe the two markets’ improving integration, the “iceberg,” to describe relative
isolation at the platform/systems integrator level,
and much more extensive integration at lower levels of the supply chain. See figure on previous page,
“The Transatlantic Defense Industry,” from Jeffrey
P. Bialos et al., Fortresses and Icebergs, supra, at 7.
Despite this growing integration in the transatlantic defense market, the authors of Fortresses and
Icebergs concluded that, over the coming years, new
efficiencies within the market and growing external
barriers to the European defense market—including,
potentially, efficiencies and barriers caused by the
defense procurement directive itself—are likely to
reduce U.S. exporters’ share of that market. Id. at
12–18; see also Stacy N. Ferraro, The European Defense Agency: Facilitating Defense Reform or Forming
Fortress Europe?, 16 Transnat’l & Contemp. Probs.
549, 620 (2007) (“U.S. defense firms should expect
increased difficulties competing in Europe with each
passing year of the [European Defence Agency’s] existence, which is due to Europe’s creating the legal
and administrative framework that will facilitate
the ease of transfer and development of defense
equipment within Europe”).
The European Procurement Directives—
To understand the European defense procurement
directive, it is important to understand that the
defense directive is only the latest in a long series of
European procurement directives, stretching back
several decades. See, e.g., Susan R. Sandler, CrossBorder Competition in the European Union: Public
Procurement and the European Defence Equipment
Market, 7 Wash U. Global Stud. L. Rev. 373 (2008).
These directives set frameworks—a minimum set
of requirements—within which member states may
write their procurement laws and rules. If a European
member state’s procurement procedures or practices
violate the directives, interested parties (including,
potentially, a disappointed bidder) may seek relief,
potentially (depending on the circumstances) through
the Commission, the courts, or other bid protest (or
“remedies”) mechanisms.
The directives have grown increasingly detailed
and prescriptive over the years, as the European
© 2009 Thomson Reuters
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Commission has pushed to exert more control over
the sometimes fractious European procurement
market. See generally Sue Arrowsmith, The Past
and Future Evolution of EC Procurement Law: From
Framework to Common Code?, 35 Pub. Cont. L.J. 337
(2006); Jean-Jacques Verdeaux, Public Procurement
in the European Union and in the United States: A
Comparative Study, 32 Pub. Cont. L.J. 713 (2003);
Charlene Barshefsky, Alastair Sutton and Jo Anne
Swindler, Developments in EC Procurement Law
Under the 1992 Program, 1990 Brig. Young U. L. Rev.
1269; Allen B. Green, European Community Procurement—Part II, 91-6 Briefing Papers 1. The directives’
core goal is simple: to unify procurement markets
across the European continent, by harmonizing procurement rules and processes.
The Defense Directive—The latest directive
extends the goal of European integration to defense
markets by establishing a common framework for
defense procurements across the member states. See,
e.g., Wolfram Hertel, Falk Schning and David W. Burgett, Feature Comment: New EU Legal Framework for
the Defense Industry, 50 GC ¶ 399; see also Baudouin
Heuninckx, A Primer to Collaborative Defence Procurement in Europe: Troubles, Achievements and Prospects, 2008 Pub. Proc. L. Rev. 123 (discussing option
of collaborative procurement). The new directive is
intended to counter what was an “historically nationalistic approach to defense procurement,” which cut
“against the core princip[les] of the European Community, which has as its central premise—inherent in its
treaty obligations—the concept of a ‘single market.’ ”
Jeffrey P. Bialos et al., Fortresses and Icebergs, supra,
at 181; see also Aris Georgopoulos, Comment on the
Recent Developments in European Defence Procurement Integration Initiatives, 2008 Pub. Pro. L. Rev.
NA8.
The new directive squarely addresses two of the
leading objections to general European requirements
for defense procurement. See, e.g., Tim Briggs, The
New Defence Procurement Directive, 2009 Pub. Proc.
L. Rev. NA129. First, the new directive includes special provisions, not part of the general procurement
directives (Directives 2004/17/EC and 2004/18/EC),
to accommodate classified information and security
of supply. Second, the new directive exempts member states’ procurements if they “are so sensitive
that even the new rules cannot satisfy their security
needs.” Commission Press Release IP/09/1250 (Aug.
25, 2009).
3
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This latter point—which sensitive procurements
should be exempt from European regulation and left
to the sovereign discretion of the member states—had
long been contentious. See, e.g., Aris Georgopoulos,
The European Commission Proposal for the Enactment of a Defence Procurement Directive, 2008 Pub.
Proc. L. Rev. 81; Baudouin Heuninckx, Towards a
Coherent European Defence Procurement Regime?
European Defence Agency and European Commission
Initiatives, 2008 Pub. Proc. L. Rev. 1. Article 296 of
the Treaty Establishing the European Community
protects member states’ sovereignty, and allows any
member state to “take such measures as it considers
necessary for the protection of the essential interests
of its security which are connected with the production of or trade in arms, munitions and war material.”
See Sue Arrowsmith, supra, 35 Pub. Cont. L. J. at
367–68.
While the European Court of Justice’s decisions
had interpreted Article 296 narrowly, as the European
Commission acknowledged in a 2004 position paper,
“in the absence of a precise interpretation of these
provisions, there is quasisystematic use of the derogation in the area of public procurement.” European
Commission, Green Paper on Defence Procurement,
supra, at 6. The Commission noted that, despite the
ECJ’s clarifications of Article 296, “the low number
of [defense procurement] publications in the Official
Journal of the European Union [the official gazette
for publicizing European procurement opportunities] appear[ed] to imply that some Member States
believe[d] they [could] apply the derogation automatically.” Id. Thus, despite a cautionary Commission
Interpretative Communication on the Application of
Article 296, supra; see also Aris Georgopoulos, The
Commission’s Interpretative Communication on the
Application of Article 296 EC in the Field of Defence
Procurement, 2007 Pub. Proc. L. Rev. NA43; EU Continues Efforts to Build Up Defense Industry, 4 IGC ¶
10, apparently many member states have been routinely ignoring the existing procurement directives
when they carry out defense procurements.
As a form of secondary procurement legislation,
the defense directive is an important step forward,
though it is certainly not a radical step forward:
s $IRECTIVE !LLOWS &LEXIBLE 0ROCUREMENT -ETHods: Recognizing the complexity of most defense
procurements, the new directive takes a more
flexible approach to permitted procurement
methods. The directive would permit, inter alia,
4
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publicized “negotiated” procurements (what we
in the U.S. would call less than full-and-open
competition, or, in extreme cases, “sole-source”
procurements), and competitive dialogue (the
analogue to contracting by competitive negotiation under Federal Acquisition Regulation pt.
15 in the U.S. federal system). See Directive
2009/81/EC, Chapter V. From a U.S. perspective, what is surprising is the defense directive’s drafters’ slight reluctance to allow the
use of competitive dialogue, see id. Article 37
(report required explaining use of competitive
dialogue). In U.S. defense procurement, the
parallel procedures (competitive negotiations
under FAR pt. 15) are, in contrast, the norm in
advanced weapon systems procurements.
s $IRECTIVE !LLOWS &RAMEWORK )$)1 #ONTRACTS
The new directive also specifically allows
“framework” agreements, which are known in
the U.S. federal system as indefinite-delivery,
indefinite-quantity contracts. On both sides
of the Atlantic, these are increasingly popular
vehicles for contracting. See Christopher R.
Yukins, Are IDIQs Inefficient? Sharing Lessons
with European Framework Contracting, 37 Pub.
Cont. L.J. 545 (2008).
s 3OCIOECONOMIC 0ROGRAMS %ASED FROM $EFENSE
Procurements: In many nations, European
defense procurement has long been burdened
with socioeconomic goals. “Many European
defense procurement programs today,” noted a
2005 CSIS report, “are indirect jobs programs;
parliaments across Europe embed the retention
of jobs into their defense procurement budgets
as a central goal even when these policies result
in higher costs than buying equipment from
alternative sources.” David R. Scruggs et al.,
European Defense Integration, supra, at 72. The
defense directive attempts to ease socioeconomic
goals—specifically, jobs creation—from the European defense realm, by insisting that “no performance conditions may pertain to requirements
other than those relating to the performance of
the contract itself.” Recital (45); see Article 20.
This bar is apparently intended, at least in part,
to exclude extraneous conditions—including socioeconomic requirements that are not directly
related to contract performance.
s "ID 0ROTESTS2EMEDIES In keeping with the
European nations’ increasing reliance on bid
© 2009 Thomson Reuters
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protest (“remedies”) systems, see, e.g., Martin
Dischendorfer and Sue Arrowsmith, Case Comment: Case C-212/02, Commission v. Austria:
The Requirement for Effective Remedies to Challenge an Award Decision, 2004 Pub. Proc. L. Rev.
NA165, Title IV of the new defense directive
includes extensive provisions for challenges to
awards under the new directive. There are no
parallel provisions for protests under the U.S.’
reciprocal defense agreements with European
nations (discussed below), and so one logical
question would be whether these remedies provisions should be incorporated by reference into
those bilateral agreements, to ensure that U.S.
exporters have recourse to review to challenge
discrimination they may experience in the European defense market.
Potential Discriminatory Impact—European
policymakers have been careful to emphasize that
the new directive is not, on its face, discriminatory
against U.S. and other foreign exporters to the EuroPEAN DEFENSE MARKET ! h&REQUENTLY !SKED 1UESTIONv
posted with the new directive noted:
Directive 2009/81/EC will not change the situation for arms trade with third countries, which
remain governed by [World Trade Organization]
rules and in particular the Government Procurement Agreement (GPA). It remains Member
States’ decision to open or not to open competition to non-EU suppliers, in compliance with the
GPA. Awarding authorities will still be free to
invite EU companies exclusively, or to include
non-EU companies.

ec.europa.eu/internal_market/publicprocurement/
docs/defence/faqs_28-08-09_en.pdf. By its terms, the
directive also will not cover procurements done under
cooperative arrangements (such as European nations’
joint defense initiatives with NATO), see Recital
(28), and procurements governed by member states’
separate agreements with other nations (such as the
U.S. reciprocal defense agreements, discussed below),
id. Recital (26). See Directive 2009/81/EC, Recitals
(26), (28), Articles 12 (contracts awarded pursuant to
international rules) & 13 (specific exclusions). These
exclusions will likely provide U.S. vendors with important safe harbors against discrimination.
Nevertheless, there remains serious concern that
in practice the new directive could be used to discriminate against U.S. (and other foreign) vendors. For U.S.
exporters, this is an especially acute concern because
© 2009 Thomson Reuters
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for many years U.S. defense exports to Europe have
consistently exceeded (by wide margins) European
defense exports to the U.S.—an “imbalance” of which
Europeans have been keenly aware, and which has
itself stirred trade frictions. See, e.g., Jeffrey Bialos
et al., Fortresses and Icebergs, supra, at 122–23; Aris
Georgopoulos, U.S. Air Force Tanker Contract: Revisiting American Protectionism in Defence Procurement?, 2008 Pub. Proc. L. Rev. NA162. To maintain
their share of the European market, U.S. exporters
will likely remain highly sensitive to the potentially
discriminatory impacts of the new directive:
s $IRECTIVE (INTS AT 0OWER TO %XCLUDE "ECAUSE
as noted, the WTO GPA generally does not
cover defense materiel, the directive leaves
open the possibility that European member
states may exclude foreign vendors in the defense market. The general exclusion of defense
materiel from the GPA, notes Recital (18) of
the directive, “means also that in the specific
context of defence and security markets, Member States retain the power to decide whether
or not their contracting authority/entity may
allow economic operators from third countries
to participate in contract award procedures.”
Although the directive suggests that member
states “should take that decision on grounds
of value for money,” and recognizes the need
for “open and fair markets,” the directive also
recognizes “the need for a globally competitive
European Defence Technological and Industrial Base,” and the importance of “obtaining
of mutual benefits”—all of which may be read,
by some, to countenance discrimination against
foreign defense contractors.
s 3PECIAL 3ECURITY 2EQUIREMENTS -AY %XCLUDE
U.S. Firms: The new defense directive specifically allows for requiring special security measures
in procurement, and for requiring security of
supply. E.g., Directive 2009/81/EC, Recital (42),
Articles 7 (protection of classified information),
22 (security of information), 23 (security of supply). The recitals further call for a “[European]
Union-wide regime on security of information,
including the mutual recognition of national
security clearances and allowing the exchange
of classified information between contracting authorities/entities and European companies,” and
specifically acknowledge that, for now, member
states have extensive discretion in setting secu5

¶ 383

rity requirements. Id. Recitals (9), (68). As this
internal European security regime continues to
take shape, U.S. firms may find that this raises,
in practice, a barrier to entry to the European
defense market.
s 4ECHNICAL 3PECIFICATIONS -AY )N 0RACTICE
Discriminate: Unlike the WTO GPA, which
specifically calls for nondiscriminatory technical specifications, the new defense directive
gives a preference to technical specifications
based on “international,” “European” or “national” standards. See Directive 2009/81/
EC, Recital (38), Article 18 (technical specifications). In practice, this may discriminate against U.S. products built around
non-European, and non-international,
standards.
s 3PECIALLY 3ENSITIVE 0ROCUREMENTS %XCLUDED
By its terms, per Recital (27) and Article 13,
the directive excludes specially sensitive
procurements, including “procurements provided by intelligence services, or procurement for all types of intelligence activities ...
as defined by Member States,” and “particularly
sensitive purchases which require an extremely
high level of confidentiality, such as ... certain
purchases intended for border protection or
combating terrorism.” Because of the subjective
and broad nature of these exemptions, they may
be overused, in practice, to shield procurements
from the transparency and competition that the
new directive would normally require.
s !RTICLE  ,OOPHOLE 3TILL !VAILABLE !LTHOUGH
the intent behind the new defense directive was
to narrow the instances when member states
can claim exemption from general procurement
rules on grounds of national security, per Article 296, Recital (16) of the new directive itself
leaves the door open for asserting an exemption
under Article 296 where, for example, “contracts
in the fields of both defence and security ...
necessitate such extremely demanding security of supply requirements or which are
so confidential and/or important for national
sovereignty that even the specific provisions
of this Directive are not sufficient to safeguard
Member States’ essential security interests.” By
leaving this door open to defense procurements
outside the directive, the Commission has left
open the possibility that member states—which
6

The Government Contractor®

retain “sole responsibility” for their national security, id. Recital (1)—may attempt to exclude
foreign competition by asserting exemptions
under Article 296.
s ,IMITED 0ROTECTIONS 5NDER 74/ '0! The GPA,
which European policymakers often point to
as the main guarantor of open markets, generally does not cover trade in arms, munitions
and defense materials. See GPA, Art. XXIII(1)
(“Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed
to prevent any Party from taking any action or
not disclosing any information which it considers necessary for the protection of its essential
security interests relating to the procurement of
arms, ammunition or war materials, or to procurement indispensable for national security or
for national defence purposes.”). Specific nations’
coverage under the GPA also tends to exclude
defense items; for example, the European Communities’ Annex 1 to the WTO GPA, which lists
the European agencies and products open to
competition from other GPA members, covers
only part of the defense market. Id., available
at www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/
appendices_e.htm. Many European procuring entities and procurements are simply not
covered by the GPA, which has always focused
primarily on non-defense procurement.
s 2ECIPROCAL $EFENSE !GREEMENTS $O .OT 0ROVIDE
Complete Protection Against Discrimination:
For decades, the U.S. and many of the European
Community’s member nations have agreed,
through bilateral memoranda of understanding (reciprocal defense agreements), to open
their respective defense procurement markets.
See Drew B. Miller, Note, Is It Time to Reform
Reciprocal Defense Procurement Agreements?,
39 Pub. Cont. L.J. 93 (2009) (forthcoming);
U.S. Government Accountability Office, Federal
Procurement: International Agreements Result
in Waivers of Some U.S. Domestic Source Restrictions (GAO-05-188), at 23 (2005) (listing
countries), www.gao.gov/new.items/d05188.pdf;
International Agreements Waive U.S. Domestic
Source Restrictions, 47 GC ¶ 89. These bilateral
agreements are implemented in U.S. law through
§ 225.872 of the Defense FAR Supplement,
and are gathered at www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/
cpic/ic/reciprocal_procurement_memoranda_
of_understanding.html. Under these agreements,
© 2009 Thomson Reuters
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the U.S. has generally agreed not to discriminate
against defense supplies from partner “qualifying
nations.” These agreements, which cover many,
but not all, of the European member states, do
not provide complete protection against discrimination in the transatlantic defense trade. See
Drew B. Miller, supra. For example, as noted, unlike the GPA, these agreements typically do not
include a provision allowing suppliers to protest
(sue for remedies) under national law to enforce
their rights against discrimination; instead, the
agreements generally leave it to the signatory
defense ministries to resolve any disagreements
through consultation. See, e.g., Memorandum of
Understanding Between the Federal Minister of
Defense of the Federal Republic of Germany and
the Secretary of Defense of the United States of
America Concerning the Principles Governing
Mutual Cooperation in the Research and Development, Production, Procurement and Logistic
Support of Defense Equipment, Art. VII (1978),
www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/Docs/mou-germany.
pdf. If U.S. vendors fear discrimination under
the new directive, they may press for broader
remedies under these bilateral agreements.
Conclusion—The challenge for the U.S. procurement community is to see the new defense directive

© 2009 Thomson Reuters

as part of a changing, dynamic transatlantic defense
market, and to understand how the directive relates
to the U.S.’ broader national security interests. If the
directive, as intended, strengthens the European
defense supplier base and enhances competition and
transparency in European defense procurement, the
directive will advance the U.S.’ interests in a robust
transatlantic defense market. If, however, the directive is implemented by member states to lock out U.S.
or other foreign exporters—or if it is perceived as a
protectionist tool—the directive may, unfortunately,
serve as a flashpoint for protectionism.

✦
This FEATURE COMMENT was written for THE GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR by Christopher R. Yukins
(cyukins@law.gwu.edu), Associate Professor of
Government Contract Law and Co-Director of
the Government Procurement Law Program at
The George Washington University Law School.
Author’s Note: On Friday, November 6, at The George
Washington University Law School, 2000 H Street
N.W., Washington, D.C., from 9:30–11:00 a.m., a colloquium will be held on the new European defense
procurement directive. For further information on the
colloquium, please visit www.pubklaw.com/events/
gwu110609.pdf.
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